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Introduction
Pluralistic ignorance is a recurrent topic in Sociology and Psychology, and it is also treated 
in Cognitive Sciences and Philosophy of Social Sciences. Firstly mentioned as such by Katz and 
Allport (1931), it refers to the est ablishment of a social norm or behavior when every agent pri-
vately refuses such norm or behavior but she believes that most other agents assume and follow 
it. Many studies about this phenomenon have been developed, most of them useful applications 
to different attitudes and behaviors: teenagers drinking alcohol, classroom habits, top manage-
ments attitudes, racist attitudes, revenge and infidelity behaviors, etc. Nevertheless, theoretical 
accurate approaches to the phenomenon, its definition and treatment are scarce. Although this is 
ABSTRACT
Pluralistic ignorance is usually analyzed in terms of social norms. Recently, Bjerring, Han-
sen and Pedersen (2014) describe and define this phenomenon in terms of beliefs, actions 
and evidence.  Here I apply a basic epistemic approach to belief – believers consider their 
beliefs to be true –, a basic pragmatic approach to belief – beliefs are useful for believers 
– and a mixed epistemic-pragmatic approach – believers consider their believes to be true 
and such considerations are useful – to pluralistic ignorance phenomena. For that, I take the 
definition given by Bjerring et al. (2014).
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RESUMO 
A ignorância pluralística é geralmente analisada em termos de normas sociais. Recentemen-
te, Bjerring, Hansen e Pedersen (2014) descreveram e definiram esse fenômeno em termos 
de crenças, ações e evidências. Aqui eu uso uma abordagem epistêmica básica para a cren-
ça – os crentes consideram suas crenças verdadeiras –, uma abordagem pragmática básica 
para a crença – as crenças são úteis para os crentes – e uma abordagem epistêmica-prag-
mática mista – os crentes consideram suas crenças como verdadeiras e tais considerações 
são úteis – para o fenômeno de ignorância pluralista. Para isso, utilizo a definição dada por 
Bjerring et al. (2014).
Palavras-chave: Verdade, pragmatismo, crença epistêmica, crença pragmática.
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a theoretical approach, I exemplify such theoretical approach 
with the classroom case, one of the most popular cases in the 
Pluralistic Ignorance literature.
In the second section I consider the definition of plu-
ralistic ignorance given by Bjerring, Hansen and Pedersen 
(2014). This definition explains pluralistic ignorance in terms 
of beliefs, act ions and evidence and it is going to be the basis 
for the rest of the study. In the third section I consider a broad 
epistemic approach to belief – for an agent S and a proposi-
tion p, S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true – and 
I apply such approach to the analysis of pluralistic ignorance 
according to the definition given by Bjerring et al. (2014). In 
the fourth section I consider a broad pragmatic approach to 
belief – for an agent S and a proposition p, S believes p only 
if to believe p is useful for S – and I apply such approach to 
the analysis of pluralistic ignorance according to the defini-
tion given by Bjerring et al. (2014). Furthermore, I consider 
a mixed epistemic-pragmatic approach to believe – for an 
agent S and a proposition p, (i) S believes p if and only if S
considers p to be true and (ii) to consider p to be true is useful 
for S – and I apply such approach to the analysis of pluralis-
tic ignorance according to the definition given by Bjerring et 
al. (2014). Finally, in the fifth section I defend that a theo-
retical study of pluralistic ignorance is useful to model such 
phenomena. Moreover, that pluralistic ignorance phenomena 
can offer some clues and arguments in the debate between 
pragmatic and epistemic accounts of belief. I conclude that 
pluralistic ignorance can be easily understood if we take a 
pure epistemic position about beliefs, accepting that final be-
haviors and act ions depend not only on beliefs but on other 
pragmatic elements and attitudes. Nevertheless, the pragmat-
ic position may offer a coherent complex analysis that does 
not need of the concept of truth. Finally, I state that a mixed 
epistemic-pragmatic position is harder to apply but it can ex-
plain pluralistic ignorance more accurately.  
What is Pluralistic Ignorance?
Roughly put, a social situation is a situation 
of pluralistic ignorance when a group of in-
dividuals all have the same attitude towards 
some proposition or norm, all act contrary 
to this attitude, and all wrongly believe that 
everyone else in the group has a certain 
conflicting attitude to the proposition or 
norm (Bjerring et al., 2014, p. 2446).
Literature about pluralistic ignorance usually focuses on 
some popular examples:  teenagers drinking alcohol (Pren-
tice; Miller, 1993), classroom habits, top managements atti-
tudes, racist attitudes, revenge and infidelity behaviors (Lam-
bert; Kahn; Apple, 2003), etc. Bjerring et al. (2014) actually 
refer to three of these cases: the classroom case, the college 
drinking case and the Emperor’s case (Bjerring et al., 2014, p. 
2448). Although this is a theoretical approach, I will refer to 
the classroom case in order to exemplify how the epistemic, 
the pragmatic and the mixed approaches to belief can apply 
to pluralistic ignorance:
(The classroom case) A professor asks her 
students if they have any doubt when fin-
ishing a -particularly difficult- lesson. Every-
body doubts but nobody raises hands: each 
student believes the rest of students have 
understood the lesson and as nobody wants 
to be publicly displayed as the only igno-
rant, nobody asks (Katz; Allport, 1931).
Different cases are argued in order to explain plural-
istic ignorance (Brennnan et al., 2013; Bicchieri, 2006). 
The main one considered is a self-other difference while 
interpreting personal and others’ beliefs and actions. There 
can be also an encoding difference in which actions feed 
wrong beliefs. Minorities – e.g. clever students in the class-
room case – can influence the rest of people and in that 
way they can feed pluralistic ignorance. There can be a de-
sire to maintain social identity even if accepting and acting 
according to falsehoods. And there can also be a lack of 
transparent communication. 
Many of the definitions and theoretical approaches to 
pluralistic ignorance treats the phenomenon in terms of so-
cial norms (Prentice; Miller, 1993; Bicchieri, 2006; Brennan 
et al., 2013). Nevertheless, the definition given by Bjerring et 
al. (2014), after a detailed analyses of the main definitions, 
already given treats pluralistic ignorance as a system of beliefs, 
act ions and evidence:
‘Pluralistic ignorance’ refers to a situation 
where the individual members of a group 
(i) all privately believe some proposition p;
(ii) all believe that everyone else believes ¬p;
(iii) all act contrary to their private belief that 
p (i.e. act as if they believe ¬p); and where
(iv) all take the actions of the others as 
strong evidence for their private beliefs 
about p (Bjerring et al, 2014, p. 2458).
Interestingly, there is a circular connection between 
steps (ii), (iii) and (iv) that helps to explain pluralistic igno-
rance persistence. Every agent S – who believes p – believes 
that the rest believe ¬p (ii), so S acts contrary to her initial be-
lief p (i.e. act as if she believes ¬p) (iii), and in that way S pro-
vides strong evidence for the rest (iv) to believe that S believes 
¬p (ii). In the classroom case, every student believes that the 
rest of students believe that they do understand the lesson (ii), 
so every student acts contrary to her private belief that she 
does not understand the lesson (i.e. act as if she believes that 
she understands the lesson) (iii), and in that way every stu-
dent provides strong evidence for the rest (iv) to believe that 
she believes that she understands the lesson.  
Two question arises from this definition. First, it can be 
argued that the qualification of the agent’s attitude as a be-
lief - S believes that she does not understand the lesson; every 
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student believes that the rest of students believe that they do 
understand the lesson – is odd – it is more usual to state that 
‘S does not understand the lesson’ and that ‘all believe that ev-
eryone else understands the lesson’. The authors realize this 
criticism and they state that pluralistic ignorance cases can be 
reformulated as involving beliefs – e.g. “each student believes 
that everyone but him believes that the material was not diffi-
cult” (Bjerring et al., 2014, p. 2448). I accept this assumption2. 
Second, the circularity between (ii), (iii) and (iv) helps 
to explain pluralistic ignorance persistence. Nevertheless, it 
does not fully explain pluralistic ignorance emergence. It does 
not say which step comes first, that is, it does not est ablish if 
first particular agents develop their beliefs about the rest of 
agents (ii), if their particular act ions motivate the rest to de-
velop the rest beliefs (iii) or if the act ions of the rest motivate 
the particular agent to believe that the rest understand the 
lesson (iv). In other words, this charact erization of pluralistic 
ignorance does not fully explain what comes first: beliefs (ii) 
or evidence to further develop beliefs (iii & iv). In the class-
room case, it can be easily defended that first agents do not 
raise their hands to solve their doubts (iii & iv) and then they 
privately develop their beliefs about of the rest of students’ be-
liefs (ii). Nevertheless, in other cases the priority of evidence 
is less clear3. This question opens an interesting ramification 
for the study of evidentialism on beliefs, but this is a topic for 
another occasion. 
I defend that pluralistic ignorance is an empirical phe-
nomenon useful for the analysis of belief´s nature. The goal of 
this paper is to analyze and apply different conceptions of belief 
to the pluralistic ignorance definition in terms of beliefs given 
by Bjerring et al. (2014): a broad epistemic approach (third sec-
tion: for an agent S and a proposition p, S believes p if and only 
if S considers p to be true), a broad pragmatic approach (fourth 
section: for an agent S and a proposition p, S believes p only if 
to believe p is useful for S) and a mixed epistemic-pragmatic 
approach to belief (fifth section:  for an agent S and a proposi-
tion p, (i) S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true and 
(ii) to consider p to be true is useful for S). I determine that all 
the previous approaches to belief may apply to the pluralistic 
ignorance definition in terms of belief given by Bjerring et al.
(2014), although the mixed epistemic-pragmatic approach of-
fers a more detailed and sp ecific explanation of the phenome-
non. At the same time, the theoretical study of belief is useful to 
model pluralistic ignorance itself. 
An epistemic approach of belief 
applied to pluralistic ignorance
Links between belief and truth is a recurrent topic in 
epistemology. Recently, some normative approaches are be-
ing defended – e.g. a belief p is correct if and only if p is true 
(Wedgwood, 2013), agents ought to believe p if and only if p
is true (Wedgwood, 2013), agents may believe p if and only 
if p is true (Whiting, 2010), agents ought to want their be-
liefs to be true (Horwich, 2013), a virtue-theoretic account 
of epistemic norms of belief (Turp, 2013). Other authors 
(Engel, 2013a, 2013b; Toribio, 2013; Papineau, 2013; Glüer; 
Wikforss, 2013) explain the relationship between belief and 
truth in non-normative terms. Here I take a broad relation-
ship between belief and truth that most authors who consider 
an epistemic treatment of belief would accept, even if it may 
be too soft for some of them (Glüer; Wikforss, 2013). 
For an agent S and a proposition p, S believes p if and 
only if S considers p to be true.
It must be pointed that this basic relationship between be-
lief and truth relates to the agent’s attitude – S considers p – and 
not to the content nor the final result of her belief – just  p.4
The application of this broad epistemic approach of be-
lief to pluralistic ignorance phenomena considering the defi-
nition given by Bjerring et al. (2014) results as follows, 
‘Pluralistic ignorance’ refers to a situation 
where the individual members of a group 
(i) all privately consider true some proposi-
tion p;
(ii) all consider true that everyone else con-
siders true ¬p;
(iii) all act contrary to their private consider-
ation that p is true (they act as if they con-
sider true ¬p); and where
(iv) all take the actions of the others as 
strong evidence for their private consider-
2 In their footnote 6, Bjerring et al. (2014) state that: “For the purposes of this paper, we characterize situations of pluralistic ignorance 
in terms of a discrepancy between private and public beliefs. But note that other attitudes could in principle be used to characterize 
pluralistic ignorance. For instance, several characterizations of pluralistic ignorance involve attitudes towards norms rather than beliefs 
about propositions (…) the College Drinking Case can naturally be reformulated as involving norms rather than beliefs. However, since 
nothing substantial in our discussion hangs on the difference between “having a belief towards a proposition” and “having an attitude 
towards a norm”, we will work with the first locution in what follows” (Bjerring et al., 2014, p. 2449).
3 For instance, in the College Drinking Case nobody drinks alcohol at the very first moment. There must be some few teenagers that 
start drinking alcohol seeing nobody else doing so.
4 It may be argued that this characterization of belief is true only for explicit beliefs, but that cannot be the case for implicit beliefs. Let´s 
consider wishful thinking cases like the following one: (Kate’s hated terrorist case A). Kate’s son is a terrorist hated by the whole – or 
almost the whole – country, but she believes her son is innocent despite the reliable evidence showing that her son is a terrorist. Kate´s 
implicit belief is false but she still considers it to be true because of self-deception (Adler; Hicks, 2013, p. 164). The broad epistemic 
characterization of belief I am taking – the broadest I know – does not relate belief and truth in terms of the content itself, but in terms 
of the agent´s attitude.
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ations about the truth of p (based on Bjer-
ring et al, 2014, p. 2458).
In the classroom case, (i) every student privately con-
siders true that she does not understand the lesson, (ii) ev-
ery student considers true that everyone else considers true 
that they do understand the lesson, (iii) every student acts 
contrary to their private consideration that she truly does not 
understand the lesson (she acts as if she considers true that 
she understands the lesson), and (iv) every student takes the 
act ions of the others as strong evidence for her private consid-
erations about the truth of the rest of students understanding 
the lesson. 
The application of the basic epistemic treatment of be-
lief proposed is easy and it perfectly fits. The only premise we 
need to assume is that for act ing not only epistemic consider-
ations but other considerations like pragmatic ones may come 
into play – e.g. a self-other difference or social attributions. 
In pluralistic ignorance, final act ion (iii) against the agent’s 
particular belief (i) partly finds its explanation in the belief 
about the rest beliefs (ii). The differences between beliefs and 
act ions are already assumed by most authors that analyze 
the relationship between belief and truth (Whiting, 2014; 
Bykvist; Hattiangadi, 2013, p. 114; Unwin, 2007). 
A pragmatic approach of belief 
applied to pluralistic ignorance
The explanation of belief in pragmatic terms is also a 
recurrent topic in Philosophy (Engel, 2013a; Papineau, 2013; 
Rinard, 2015; see also The numbers games in Reisner, 2013)5. 
In this section, I consider a broad pragmatic charact erization 
of belief. Such charact erization does not use the concept of 
truth and it is based on a general pragmatic idea about beliefs: 
beliefs are useful for their bearers, they always have a positive 
effect on their bearers. 
For an agent S and a proposition p, S believes p only if 
to believe p is useful for S. Or, if preferred, for an agent 
S and a proposition p, if S believes p then to believe p 
is useful for S. 
It may be argued that the notion of being useful or prac-
tical is vague. Here I take a broad relationship between belief 
and useful effects – the broadest pragmatic charact erization 
of belief I know – for the sake of the pragmatic argument, 
even if it may be too soft for some of the authors.6
Some considerations about this basic pragmatic treat-
ment of belief should be done. First, there is no double im-
plication in this consideration: a belief p may be useful for an 
agent but it does not force the agent to adopt such belief. In 
other words, it is not the case that (if S belief on p is useful for 
S, then S believes p). Many examples of useful non-possible 
beliefs are present in the literature on beliefs7. 
Second, contrary to the previous basic epistemic ap-
proach, it may be not the very believer who considers her 
belief to be useful but another agent. The basic pragmatic 
approach states that ‘to believe p is useful for the believer 
S’ but that does not mean that the believer S considers her 
belief p to be useful. That is, it may be other agent S2 who 
considers the belief p whose bearer is S to be useful for S8. 
Third, the content of the believed proposition p does 
not need to be considered useful for the believer S but just the 
attitude of believing. In other words, it is not the case that (if 
S believes p then p is useful for S). Much less a useful proposi-
5 Engel (2013a) accurately sketches this question: There are, after all, plenty of ways in which we can assess beliefs, besides their truth or 
falsity, and in a number of cases it can be beneficial to disregard or to ignore their alethic or rational dimensions. Why suppose that there 
is only one standard of evaluation? Why should we adopt the absolutist view that there is only one constitutive norm of belief rather 
than the relativist view that there is no particular privileged criterion for assessing belief which enjoys a privileged status? On this view 
there might be as many ‘norms’ for beliefs as there are dimensions of evaluation, depending upon our particular interests in particular 
contexts, none of which enjoy any central status (Engel, 2013a, p. 34-35)
6 Interestingly, Rinard (2015) defends ‘Robust Pragmatism’, the thesis that (i) a pragmatic reason for a belief is always a genuine reason 
and (ii) the only genuine reasons for beliefs are pragmatic reasons: C is a reason to believe p if and only if C is a pragmatic consideration 
in favor of believing p (Rinard, 2015, p. 218). [t]here are of course some metaphysically possible scenarios in which evidence for p would 
not constitute a pragmatic consideration in favor of believing p. Such cases are rarer than one might think, however. What we have to 
imagine is a case in which believing the truth with respect to p does not make it even a tad bit more likely that your life – or the lives of 
others – will go well. (…) Insofar as I have intuitions about such cases, it seems to me that the verdict of Robust Pragmatism is exactly 
right. If it really is the case that true beliefs concerning p would not make it even the slightest bit more likely that my life, or that of 
others, will go well; and I am genuinely completely indifferent to whether or not I believe the truth with respect to p; then, in my view, 
evidence in favor of p does not give me any reason whatsoever to believe it (Rinard, 2015, p. 220). Rinard must admit that evidential 
reasons are many times pragmatic reasons for belief formation in order to save some criticism against her robust pragmatism. See 
Whiting, 2014 and footnote 6.
7 For instance, Whiting (2014) refers to the following case: (David Cameron’s doctor’s uncle case). Suppose that one knows that if one 
were to believe that David Cameron’s doctor’s uncle has 132,487 hairs on his head one would receive a generous amount of money 
(…) since the fact that one would receive a financial reward were one to have the relevant belief is no evidence that the belief is true, it 
seems that one cannot take it to justify so believing (Whiting, 2014, p. 220).
8 For instance, let’s consider the following case: (Kate’s hated terrorist case B). Kate’s son is a terrorist hated by the whole – or almost the 
whole – country and she believes so although such belief is very painful for her. Even when Kate considers that her belief that her son is 
a hated terrorist is not useful – actually it is very painful – some other agents may find such belief useful – for instance, such information 
may allow Kate to better manage her daily social life.
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tion needs to form a belief – it is not the case that (if p is useful 
for S, then S believes p)9. 
The basic pragmatic treatment of belief just est ablishes that 
once an agent S believes p, then the attitude of believing p is useful 
for S. The application of this account to pluralistic ignorance phe-
nomena according to the definition in terms of beliefs, act ions 
and evidence provided by Bjerring et al. (2014) results as follows, 
‘Pluralistic ignorance’ refers to a situation 
where the individual members of a group 
(i) all privately believe some proposition p → 
then, it is useful for all to privately believe p;
(ii) all believe that everyone else believes ¬p 
→ then, it is useful for all to believe that ev-
eryone else believes ¬p, belief that is useful 
for them;
(iii) all act contrary to their private belief that 
p (i.e. act as if they believe ¬p), belief that is 
taken to be useful for their bearers; and where
(iv) all take the actions of the others as 
strong evidence for their private beliefs 
about p → every agent takes the actions of 
the others as strong evidence for her belief, 
which is taken to be useful for the agent, 
that the rest of agents believe ¬p, belief 
that is taken to be useful for the rest (based 
on Bjerring et al, 2014, p. 2458).
In the classroom case, first in (i) every student private-
ly believes that she does not understand the lesson and this 
belief is useful for her – e.g. the belief allows the student to 
further solve her doubts.
Second, in (ii) every student believes that everyone else 
believes that they understand the lesson. That is, it is useful 
for every student to believe (that everyone else believes that 
they understand the lesson) – i.e. in order to adopt the best 
social behavior – and everyone else belief that they under-
stand the lesson is taken to be useful for them – i.e. if they 
really understand the lesson and they are conscious, then they 
may dedicate more time to study other issues. 
Third, in (iii) every student acts contrary to her belief 
that she truly does not understands the lesson – i.e. she acts 
as if she believes that she understands the lesson – but at the 
same time such belief is taken to be useful for her. And finally, 
in (iv) every student takes the act ions of the others as strong 
evidence for her private belief, which is taken to be useful for 
her, that the rest of agents believe they understand the lesson, 
belief that is taken to be useful for them.
The application of the basic pragmatic approach of belief 
to the pluralistic ignorance phenomena in terms of the defi-
nition of Bjerring et al. (2014) is harder than the application 
of the previous basic epistemic approach. The fuzziest step 
is (iii), in which the agent acts contrary to her initial belief 
that is taken to be useful for her (i), and it is very difficult to 
envisage a basic pragmatic approach that allows for conscious 
non-useful act ions: pragmatic accounts also est ablish that 
agent’s act ions want to produce useful outcomes. But this dif-
ficulty may be solved appealing to step (ii), in which it is useful 
for every agent to believe that the rest of agents believe ¬p, 
belief that at the same time is considered to be useful for the 
rest of agents. For instance, in the classroom case every stu-
dent has two confronted beliefs: the belief that she does not 
understand the lesson and the belief that the rest of students 
understand the lesson. Both beliefs present different useful 
outcomes and finally the agent acts following the second 
belief rather than the first one. A self-other difference cause 
may be argued to explain this behavior (Brennnan et al., 2013; 
Bicchieri, 2006). Every particular agent relies more on what 
is considered to be useful for the rest of agents than on what 
it is initially considered to be useful for herself, and she finally 
develops her act ions according to what she considers to be 
more useful – i.e. to be socially accepted. Such consideration 
is enhanced by the evidence given by the others’ act ions (iv). 
A basic pragmatic account of belief may deal with plu-
ralistic ignorance phenomena and it does not take into con-
sideration the concept of truth. On the contrary, it does not 
substitute nor define belief: it just est ablishes that the belief is 
useful for the believer. The treatment of the pluralistic phe-
nomena is more difficult and fuzzier than the offered by the 
previous basic epistemic approach because different pragmat-
ic outcomes given by different beliefs confront and final ac-
tion is explained by only one of these beliefs. 
An epistemic-pragmatic 
approach of belief applied 
to pluralistic ignorance
The third and last approach I analyzed is a mixed prag-
matic-epistemic approach based on the idea that beliefs aim 
at truth and truth provides a useful reason for further act ion. 
Daniel Whiting (2014) has recently defended this idea: 
[b]elieving only the true because subjects 
aim to believe only what is a useful reason 
because subjects aim in action and decision 
to be guided only by useful reasons. The 
epistemic perspective is not in tension with 
the useful perspective but dictated and con-
tained within it (Whiting, 2014, p. 21-22). 
9 For instance, let’s consider the following case: (The table case). I see a table in front of me and I develop the belief that there is a table 
in front of me. The content of the belief – there is a table in front of me – may not be useful itself. But the attitude of believing so can 
be useful if I want to start writing or I want to walk without tripping. More specifically, in the Kate’s hated terrorist son case the propo-
sition believed – my son is a hated terrorist – is not useful, but the belief itself may be (see footnote 4). Similarly, many useful pieces of 
information are available but it does not force the agent to believe all of them.
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It must be pointed that this approach states that truth 
provides a useful reason for further act ion, but not the only 
one. Other non-epistemic reasons may be argued to explain 
further act ion. 
Based on this idea and combining the previous basic 
epistemic and pragmatic approaches to believe, I consider the 
following epistemic-pragmatic approach to belief:
For an agent S and a proposition p, 
(i) S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true 
and
(ii) If S considers p to be true, then to consider p to be 
true is useful for S.
Some considerations should be done. These considerations 
sp ecially affects (ii) and they are quite similar to the consider-
ations stated about the basic pragmatic approach to belief.  
First, there is no double implication in (ii): a consid-
eration p may be useful for an agent S but it does not force 
the agent to adopt such consideration as a true one. In oth-
er words, it is not the case that (if to consider p to be true is 
useful for S, then S considers p to be true). Many examples of 
considerations that are useful if taken to be true but that can-
not be adopted as they are not known to be true are present 
in the literature on beliefs10. 
Second, in (ii) it may be not the agent who takes her tru-
ly consideration to be useful but another agent. This epistem-
ic-pragmatic approach states that ‘to consider p to be true is 
useful for S’ but that does not mean that ‘S takes her consider-
ation p taken to be true to be useful for herself ’. That is, it may 
be other agent S2 who considers the proposition p whose bear-
er is S – and that is taken to be true by S – to be useful for S11. 
Third, the content of the proposition p considered to be 
true by S does not need to be useful for S but just the attitude
of considering p to be true. In other words, it is not the case 
that (if S considers p to be true then p is useful for S). Much 
less a useful proposition needs to form a consideration taken 
to be true – it is not the case that (if p is useful for S, then S
considers p to be true)12. 
This epistemic-pragmatic treatment of belief est ablishes 
that an agent S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true 
and that if S considers p to be true, then such consideration 
p is useful for S. The application of this account to pluralistic 
ignorance phenomena according to the definition in terms of 
beliefs, act ions and evidence provided by Bjerring et al. (2014) 
results as follows,   
‘Pluralistic ignorance’ refers to a situation 
where the individual members of a group 
(i) all privately consider true some proposi-
tion p → then, it is useful for all to privately 
consider p to be true;
(ii) all consider true that everyone else con-
siders true ¬p → then, it is useful for all to 
consider true that everyone else considers 
true ¬p, consideration that is useful for 
them;
(iii) all act contrary to their private consider-
ation that p is true (i.e. act as if they consid-
er true ¬p), consideration that is taken to be 
useful for their bearers; and where
(iv) all take the actions of the others as 
strong evidence for their private consider-
ations about the truth of p → every agent 
takes the actions of the others as strong 
evidence for her considerations taken to 
be true, which is taken to be useful for the 
agent, that the rest of agents consider true 
¬p, consideration that is taken to be useful 
for the rest (based on Bjerring et al, 2014, 
p. 2458).
In the classroom case, first in (i) every student privately 
considers true that she does not understand the lesson and 
this consideration is useful for her – i.e. it allows the student 
to further solve her doubts.
Second, in (ii) every student considers true that everyone 
else considers true that they understand the lesson. In other 
words, it is useful for every student to consider true (that every-
one else considers true that they understand the lesson) – e.g. in 
order to fit into the group – and, furthermore, it is thought that 
everyone else considers true that they understand the lesson, 
consideration that is taken to be useful for them – e.g. if any 
agent really understands the lesson and she is conscious, then 
she may dedicate more time to study other issues. 
Third, in (iii) every student acts contrary to her truly 
consideration that she does not understand the lesson – she 
acts as if she considers true that she understands the lesson 
– but at the same time the initial consideration taken to be 
true – i.e. she considers true that she does not understand the 
lesson – is also taken to be useful for her. And finally, in (iv) 
every student takes the act ions of the others as strong evi-
dence for her private consideration taken to be true, which is 
also taken to be useful for her, that the rest of agents consid-
er true that they understand the lesson, consideration that is 
also taken to be useful for them.
The application of this epistemic-pragmatic approach of 
belief to pluralistic ignorance phenomena according to Bjer-
ring et al. (2014) definition is the hardest one of the three ap-
proaches here analyzed. Once again, the most difficult step is 
(iii): agents act contrary to their initial considerations taken 
to be true and useful, something that contradicts both the 
epistemic and the pragmatic approaches. Agents act following 
10 See footnote 3 and David Cameron’s doctor’s uncle case (Whiting, 2014).
11 See footnote 4 and Kate’s hated terrorist case.
12 See footnote 5, The table case and Kate’s hated terrorist case.
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the falsity and such act ion presents disadvantages. But once 
again, the problem may be solved appealing to step (ii): it is 
useful for every agent to consider true that the rest of agents 
consider true ¬p, consideration that at the same time is taken 
to be useful for the rest of agents. In the classroom case, every 
student has two faced considerations taken to be true: on the 
one hand, she considers true that she does not understand the 
lesson, and on the other hand, she considers true that the rest 
of students understand the lesson. Both considerations taken 
to be true present different useful results and the student fi-
nally acts following the second consideration taken to be true 
rather than the first one. And once again, a self-other differ-
ence cause may be argued to explain this behavior (Brennnan 
et al., 2013; Bicchieri, 2006). Every particular agent prioritizes 
what she thinks the rest of agents consider to be true – and so 
useful – rather than what she initially considered to be true – 
and so useful – for herself, and she finally develops her act ions 
according to what she considers to be more useful – i.e. to be 
socially accepted – even when she personally considers it to 
be false. Such priority is supported by the evidence given by 
the others’ act ions (iv). 
This epistemic-pragmatic approach of belief may deal 
with pluralistic ignorance phenomena but it is harder to ap-
ply. At the same time, it still needs the concept of true to run 
and succeed. Different pragmatic outcomes confront and the 
final act ion is explained according to social beliefs – i.e. beliefs 
about the rest beliefs or truly considerations about what the 
rest consider to be true. That supposes that every agent final-
ly acts contrary to what she considers to be true – i.e. every 
agent finally acts contrary to her initial belief – because she 
considers such act ion to be more useful. Even if fuzzier, this 
epistemic-pragmatic approach offers a more accurate theo-
retical description of pluralistic ignorance. 
Conclusions
Pluralistic ignorance offers some clues on the traditional 
debate about the nature of belief and its epistemic and prag-
matic features. At the same time, the philosophical debate on 
belief also provides some interesting keys to better charact er-
ize and analyze pluralistic ignorance phenomena. Here I deal 
the analysis of the very phenomenon once emerged, but I also 
showed that the study of pluralistic ignorance emergence may 
offer some interesting clues on the debate about the reasons 
for belief – e.g. if there can be non-evidential reasons for belief 
emergence – and such debate may also improve the study of 
pluralistic ignorance emergence. 
In our case, I show that a pure and basic epistemic treat-
ment of belief – believers consider their beliefs to be true – eas-
ily applies to pluralistic ignorance phenomena if we make a dif-
ference between belief and the final act ion motivated not only 
by epistemic reasons but also by another pragmatic reasons. 
I also show that a pure and basic pragmatic charact eriza-
tion of belief – beliefs are useful for believers – may apply to 
pluralistic ignorance phenomena without the necessity of the 
concept of truth. We need to consider that different personal 
beliefs – about ourselves and about the rest of agents – may 
supply different useful outcomes and final act ion depends on 
the useful outcomes supplied by the beliefs about the rest of 
agents rather than on the beliefs about ourselves. 
Finally, I defend that a mixed epistemic-pragmatic charac-
terization of belief allows for a more accurate analysis of plural-
istic ignorance. We need to accept that agents may personally 
consider something to be true and useful but that they may act 
contrary to this consideration because another consideration 
about what the rest of people consider to be true is more useful 
– although the agent does not consider true what the rest of 
people consider true. In other words, if we assume a self-oth-
er difference, then this mixed epistemic-pragmatic approach 
offers a more precise charact erization of pluralistic ignorance. 
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